26 SEP 2024.
The new Utah Valley University after-action report deserves to be read slowly because buried inside its 158 pages is a reconstruction of an event-security process that was fragmented, informal and, at critical moments, astonishingly incomplete.
The most important point is that this is not merely social-media speculation anymore. The independent review identifies concrete decisions made by TPUSA, its representatives, its private security personnel and Utah Valley University. And some of those decisions raise very serious questions.
Start with cooperation. Investigators say they repeatedly attempted to interview Brian Harpole, identified as the leader of the Integrity Solutions team protecting Charlie Kirk. They tried telephone calls and a certified letter. No response. They also sought interviews with TPUSA Security Supervisor Dan Flood and senior field representative Maycee Crofts. Neither participated. Senior TPUSA personnel in Phoenix were contacted for assistance. Again, according to the report, there was no response. Even a Utah risk-management official urged cooperation.
That proves no sinister motive. But after the assassination of the organization’s CEO, an independent investigation asking security personnel what happened would seem to present an obvious opportunity to establish the record.
Then there is the venue.
UVU personnel raised concerns about the Fountain Courtyard because an outdoor location was harder to control. TPUSA nevertheless preferred the courtyard and its own ticketing system. The report says those decisions limited UVU’s ability to obtain reliable real-time attendance information and placed the event in a more difficult security environment. The review concludes that UVU should have retained authority over venue selection, ticketing and access control rather than deferring those decisions.
This matters because the courtyard was surrounded by buildings, elevated areas, pedestrian routes and multiple vantage points. The report says those conditions required serious attention to line-of-sight assessment, elevated-position review, building access, fixed posts and protective operations. Yet there was no comprehensive written Security Assessment or Event Action Plan tying those elements together.
The planning questionnaire raises another remarkable issue. According to the report, information described as coming “straight from the TPUSA team” projected roughly 600 attendees and represented that there were no risk factors, safety or security concerns or need for emergency medical services. At the same time, UVU’s own Free Speech Committee was already flagging possible protests. The contrast is striking. The event involved a nationally known political figure, an outdoor location and private executive protection, yet the paperwork conveyed no identified security concern.
Coordination then developed late. Police Chief Jeff Long asked for contact with TPUSA security during the August planning process. When no security representative contacted him, he went looking for that contact himself. Dan Flood finally spoke with Long on September 3, only a week before the event.
The report describes what followed as “very limited” coordination. There was no structured pre-event briefing or site walkthrough involving Harpole, Flood and UVUPD. There was no integrated written plan specifying who controlled elevated positions, who handled building access, who monitored lines of sight or who was responsible for particular protective functions.
And one fact deserves emphasis. TPUSA did identify a legitimate concern. Flood warned Chief Long about the Hall of Flags elevated walkway above Charlie’s speaking position. UVU cleared it, taped it off and placed two officers there. That demonstrates that TPUSA security was not simply ignoring elevated threats.
But the report says the environment contained broader elevated-position problems beyond that single walkway. Surrounding buildings, rooftops, pedestrian areas and multiple access routes complicated the protective picture. The problem was not merely whether somebody noticed one vulnerable location. The problem was that nobody produced a comprehensive, documented line-of-sight and elevated-position plan.
That distinction is enormous.
Security cannot consist of spotting one problem at a time minutes before the principal walks onto the stage. Executive protection is supposed to be systematic. Identify the site. Map vulnerabilities. Establish responsibility. Conduct the walkthrough. Confirm posts. Establish communications. Plan emergency movement. Know who owns every critical assignment.
The report says that structure was missing.
It is also important not to rewrite the report as an indictment solely of TPUSA. UVU itself receives substantial criticism. The university allowed too much deference to the outside organization. It lacked a completed Security Assessment. It did not request additional mutual-aid resources despite having avenues to do so. It lacked dedicated real-time camera monitoring. And after the shooting, the report identifies serious problems involving emergency communications and command procedures.
In other words, this was a systems failure involving multiple actors.
But anyone who previously insisted that questions about TPUSA’s decisions or private security operation were somehow illegitimate now has to confront the report itself. Those decisions are part of the official investigative record.
The unanswered questions are straightforward.
Why did key TPUSA security figures not participate in the review?
Why was the harder-to-control outdoor location retained after concerns were raised?
Why was there no complete joint walkthrough?
Why was there no comprehensive written protective plan?
Who had responsibility for the surrounding elevated positions?
And what documentation exists showing precisely what TPUSA security believed had been covered before Charlie Kirk entered that courtyard?
Those are not conspiracy questions.
They are security questions.
And after this report, they are unavoidable.
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Stéphane Grappelli and David Grisman were a remarkable meeting of jazz generations. In this 1979 Tonight Show performance, Grappelli’s elegant, airborne violin meets Grisman’s muscular mandolin on “Dawgma” and “Swing ’39.” Grappelli, already legendary for his work with Django Reinhardt, sounds utterly contemporary beside Grisman’s progressive acoustic “Dawg” music. Their interplay is joyful, technically dazzling and completely conversational. Mark O’Connor, Mike Marshall and Rob Wasserman complete an extraordinary ensemble. Johnny Carson’s delighted reaction says almost everything.
Stephane Grappelli and David Grisman
Grappelli and Grisman play “Dawgma” and “Swing ’39” on a 1979 episode of the Tonight Show. Sadly, I turned off the VCR after the last song and missed recording a Grappelli-O’Connor duet of “Tiger Rag” that they played over the closing credits. Johnny Carson’s reaction at the end is priceless.
